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If we are to believe what the history books tell us, there was once a group of
philosophers— not unlike us, save for the fact that they lived long ago— who really were
skeptics, actual flesh and blood skeptics. These were not, we are told, philosophers who
merely found certain skeptical arguments troubling (as Descartes did), nor were they
merely philosophers who thought certain skeptical arguments were cogent (as Hume did):
No, these people were skeptics, in the very same sense in which other philosophers were
Epicureans or were Stoics.
Now I think many will be inclined to suppose that we need not perform any
elaborate historical investigations in order to justify a belief that such creatures never
existed, for the simple reason that what is described above is not psychologically
possible, and this is something to which we can be privy without doing any external
investigations. There never were philosophers who really did suspend judgm ent about all
non-evident m atters1 because doing so is psychologically impossible. Even if there are
skeptical arguments, which are cogent, we could never believe in accordance with the
conclusion of such an argument, by suspending judgment in response to it.2 So if we
think the skeptics claim to have done so, then we are either (i) misinterpreting them or (ii)
they were lying— or, perhaps, (more civilly) “jesting.”3
The real evidence for the objection is introspective. Think, for example, o f the
first skeptical argument you heard in Introduction to Philosophy, probably something
from Descartes or Hume. However theoretically convincing such an argument may have
seemed to you at the time, however irrefutable it may have seemed, believing its
conclusion was out o f the question. Many o f you might still think that there has not yet
been a really convincing refutation o f skepticism, but no one here (I suspect) believes the
skeptical conclusion. Raising oneself from the level o f epistemic doubts4 to actual
psychological suspension o f belief just doesn’t seem possible.
If philosophy cannot justify our beliefs, then so much the worse for philosophy.
It’s not as if we are able to give them up. “Nature,” as Hume once said, “is always too
strong for principle.”5 Even if there were cogent skeptical arguments, we couldn’t be
skeptics in any interesting sense; our nature makes us incorrigible dogmatists.
So how could there have been a group of philosophers who said they really were
skeptics? How could they have claimed to suspend judgment about all non-evident
matters which were presented to them and to have gone their way adoxastös (without
belief) by (as they said) “following the appearances” (PH 1.23)? That is the question I
would like to answer.

1.1 The Scope of Pyrrhonian Epoche
Before we can decide our answer to the question “Is Pyrrhonism psychologically
possible?” we will first need to decide what Pyrrhonism amounts to.6 More specifically,
we need to decide how to understand the scope of the skeptic’s epoché1 This, as the reader
may know, is a topic of scholarly debate nowadays. Some contemporary historians, led
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by Michael Frede,8 have argued that Sextus only claims to suspend judgment about
theoretical claims—e.g., the abstruse principles of Aristotelian nature philosophy— but
that so far as ordinary or everyday claims are concerned, the skeptics believe with the
masses. According to such interpreters, we are led into thinking that Sextus makes
impossible claims only if we misinterpret him: Properly interpreted, he makes no such
claims.
Surely, if Frede is right, Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible, for the scope of
the skeptic’s suspension would be quite local, and this very specificity would probably
suffice to assure us o f its psychological possibility. In general, our assessments of the
psychological possibility of skeptical suspension o f judgment tend to be largely a
function of the scope o f that suspension, insofar as we tend to think specificity increases
(and generality decreases) the likelihood of psychological possibility. But there is also an
additional reason for thinking that Frede’s version of Pyrrhonian epochê is psychologically
possible, and that has to do with the actual content o f the claims at issue. It is just
obvious (I think) that it is relatively easy to suspend judgment about abstruse theoretical
claims of the sort Frede has in mind. So, a combination o f specificity and specific
content makes a Frede-style suspension seem very plausible.
Fortunately or unfortunately, I m yself cannot believe that there is adequate
evidence for the Frede interpretation in the extant texts, but for my purposes here I want
to leave my dispute with Frede aside.9 I would instead rather consider what I take to have
been the historically more influential inteipretation, which is currently championed by
Myles Burnyeat.10 According to this latter interpretation, the skeptic claims to suspend
judgment about all claims about how things are—both theoretical and everyday.11 On
this interpretation, any claim about how things are, as opposed to how they merely seem
to be, is a matter about which the skeptic would suspend judgment {PH 1.19-20, 22).
And, obviously, claims about how things are will include many perfectly ordinary claims,
such as the perfectly ordinary claim that “The honey is sweet”— ‘Sure,’ the skeptic will
say, “it seems sweet” {PH 1.19-20). It is this more radical interpretation of the scope of
Pyrrhonian epoché that raises the question whether suspension o f belief on such a scale is
even possible. I want to consider the question whether Pyrrhonism, thus construed, is
psychologically possible.
Hume famously thought not.
Hume agreed with Sextus that there are
unanswerable skeptical arguments, but Hume found many of these very same arguments
to be, quite literally, incredible— unbelievable. In a famous passage we are given what
we might (somewhat playfully) call “Cleanthes’ Criterion”:
Whether your skepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we
shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up; we shall then see
whether you go out at the door or the window . . . . {Dialogues p.5)
19

The implication here is as obvious as the rhetoric is delicious.
Sextus, however, seems
to proceed as if the skeptical arguments can indeed move us, as if we can be led to
believe the skeptical conclusion(s), and subsequently go our way adoxastös.
Here is how Sextus describes the path: The Pyrrhonian skeptic inquires,
questions, etc. and is led to isostheneia (the equal balancing o f the considerations for and
the considerations against some matter in question). Faced with this equal balancing o f
considerations for and against, the matter seems undecidable; the matter’s undecidability 2
2
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then leads the skeptic to epoché (suspension o f judgment). Then, “as if by chance,” (PH
1.29) he achieves ataraxia (tranquility, freedom from disturbance, peacefulness o f mind):
[A]s regards belief the Skeptic’s goal is ataraxia, and . . . as regards things
that are unavoidable it is having moderate patbê. For when the Skeptic set
out to philosophize with the aim o f assessing his phantasia — that is, o f
determining which are true and which are false so as to achieve ataraxia —
he landed in a controversy between positions o f equal strength, and, being
unable to resolve it, he suspended judgment. But while he was thus
suspending judgment there followed by chance the sought-after ataraxia as
regards belief. (PH 1.25-27, Mates translation)
Now, if the arguments did not guide our cognitive life, then skeptical arguments would
not be able to produce isostheneia (equal balancing), undecidability, or epoché (suspension o f
judgment) and the skeptic would not fortuitously achieve ataraxia (tranquility). So, epoché,,
the causal precondition of ataraxia, if it is to be achieved by arguments, requires that we
can be moved by skeptical arguments.13
Well, we may say, so much the worse for the Pyrrhonist’s position. We know that
skeptical arguments cannot move us; therefore, we know that the Pyrrhonist’s position is
indefensible. Q.E.D. That move— that antiskeptical response— is precisely the one I
hope to cut off.

1.2 The Role of Pyrrhonian Epoche: Skepticism as a Eudaimonistic Ethic
Is it really possible that the human constitution has changed so much in two
millennia that what was once possible for humans at the time of Sextus is no longer
possible for us now? That seems quite unlikely to me. So either Pyrrhonism was
possible then and is still possible now, or it was impossible then and it is still impossible
now. If we take the latter approach (impossible then, impossible now), what shall we say
o f Sextus (if we are using the Burnyeat interpretation)?
One thing we might say, which I am disinclined to take very seriously, is that
Sextus was being disingenuous. (Here we have the ‘liars or jesters’ option.) The skeptics
claimed to suspend all belief, the objection goes, but they knew that was impossible.
Perhaps this was some sort o f grand philosophical joke on their part. Perhaps the ancient
skeptics were just clever hooligans, drawn to the antiworkaday lifestyle o f philosophy— a
band of Socratic hippies.
Unfortunately for such an interpretation, the extant sources and our knowledge o f
how the other schools interacted with the skeptics make a spoof o f such immense
proportions seem rather implausible. Really the only thing going for the hypothesis o f
insincerity is the sheer, titillating appeal o f the proportions o f the deception— it would be
like they fooled philosophical posterity itself, like learning o f an ancient tribe living
hidden in a secret society right smack in the middle o f Central Park.
But if Sextus is not a liar or a mere jester, how do we account for his claims about
the life o f a skeptic? That is, if we accept that the human constitution cannot have
changed so much as to make what was possible for Sextus //«possible for us, how can we
make sense o f Sextus? My own view is that the suspension of all belief that Sextus
claims to be definitive of a true skeptic should be viewed as definitive of the skeptic’s
ethically ideal type.14
3
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First, recall that skepticism was essentially a view o f the good life, a
eudaimonistic account, in direct competition with other such accounts. Think for a
moment of the claims made on behalf o f stoicism. Stoic writings tell us that the Sage is
not worried over things beyond his control, that he controls his emotions and serenely
accepts what must be, that he wishes things to be just exactly as they are, and so on. Now
ask yourself, did any actual Stoic— or better yet, the bulk o f them— ever really live that
way? Answer: Probably not. The “Sage” is an ideal character type for the Stoics, in
very much the same way other ethical traditions have their own ideal types. To take
another example, if one were to say “A Christian loves his neighbor and leaves judgment
for God alone,” one would not take this to mean that someone who failed to do so was
not a Christian—-or else there would be few, if any, Christians.15 Rather, a Christian is
someone who subscribes to that ideal and aspires to reach it. What makes one a
participant in this sort o f ethical tradition is your endorsing its ideal type and aspiring to
it. The “Christian,” like the “Sage,” is an idealized character type. So, too, I believe that
when Sextus refers to the “Skeptic” he has this sort of thing in mind. The Skeptic makes
no determinations (PH 1.197), neither affirming nor denying anything (P H 1.192-193),
the Skeptic suspends all belief (PH 1 passim): That is, those who consider themselves
skeptics (small “s”) aspire to be like the character (quite possibly entirely or mostly
fictional) to whom such sayings refer. Thus, although there were real skeptics, there
might not have been a “Skeptic” in the ancient world at all.
As some initial confirmation o f this line o f thought consider what Sextus has to
say about the skeptical “slogans” (phone),16 some of which were mentioned above in
characterizing the “Skeptic.” Sextus tells us that while these slogans may imply or
suggest a form of dogmatism, they should not be taken as licensing any such implications
or suggestions. Fie tells us, e.g., that the slogan “To every argument an equal argument is
opposed” (PH 1.202 ff.) might be interpreted as “To every argument let us oppose an
opposite argument!” That is, it ought to be read as an exhortation rather than as a
declaration (PH 1.204-205). This allows the skeptic to deftly sidestep certain kinds of
self-refutation charges o f the form: That slogan is a belief; therefore, you have a belief;
therefore, you are refuted. My suggestion is that the utterance “The Skeptic has no
beliefs”— which plays the same role, I think, as the slogans, viz. giving a characterization
o f the “Skeptic”— should be read in the same spirit— not, that is, as a declaration, but as
1Ί
an exhortation: “Let us have no beliefs!”
If so, certain kinds o f self-refutation
arguments can be sidestepped, and, more importantly for present purposes, our eyes will
be opened to the possibility that this otherwise very dubious declaration (“The Skeptic
has no beliefs”) is a call to action, not a victory speech.18
But does that show that Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible? W ouldn’t that
be the same as arguing that Sextus didn 7 think skepticism was believable (i.e., there were
skeptics, but no “Skeptics”)? Well, not exactly. I think— consistently with what has
been said so far—that Sextus in fact thought skepticism was believable, or, in other
words, that he thought we really could achieve epochë. So what I need now is an account
of how Sextus could have reasonably thought that.
I
have three main, closely related reasons for thinking that Sextus did indeed
accept the believability of skepticism (1, 2, & 3 below). The first is that (1) the
Pyrrhonists do not appear to have ever developed what is now known as External World
Skepticism. While the Pyrrhonists did claim to withhold belief about all non-evident
matters falling under their consideration (PH 1.199, 200, 202-203), it does not appear
4
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that the existence o f a mind-independent world— or, more concretely, the mindindependent existence o f the earth or my body— ever fell under their consideration. We
might put it this way: Pyrrhonian epochê is distributively universal, but collectively nonuniversal.19 They do claim to suspend beliefs about all non-evident matters fa llin g under
their consideration, but (purely as a matter of fact) not all non-evident matters are matters
that occurred to them or their dogmatic opponents. It seems that the Problem of the
External World has a Modern (Cartesian) origin, and simply was not formulated at the
time Sextus wrote.20
This does not mean that Pyrrhonism was only attribute or property skepticism as
opposed to existence skepticism. Nor does it mean that empirical beliefs o f the sort
problematized by Cartesian skepticism were not ever subjected to Pyrrhonian critique
(we have already seen examples o f just such empirical beliefs being critiqued). It just
means that there was no general worry about all such cases taken together as regards
their mind-independent existence.
Now since I find suspension o f belief about the mind-independent existence o f the
earth or my body more radical than suspension o f belief about the honey’s sweetness {PH
1.20) or the tow er’s true shape {PH 1.32, 118), I find Pyrrhonian epochs,, in one sense at
least, less radical (and, hence, more plausibly believable) than External World
Skepticism.
Thus, if in determining the psychological possibility o f (Sextus’)
Pyrrhonism you are trying to imagine suspending belief about the existence o f your body,
you’re considering the wrong sort o f case. And considering the wrong sorts of cases
could lead us to foreclose on a live possibility.21
Still, even if Pyrrhonism is in some sense less radical than External World
Skepticism, it seems just as global in scope— perhaps more so. Isn’t this extraordinary
scope itself sufficient to assure us that Pyrrhonism is not believable? I don’t think so and
here’s why. Although both External World Skepticism and Pyrrhonism induce very
wide-ranging doubts, they do so in entirely different ways. External World Skepticism
hopes to traverse the gap between epistemic doubts and actual psychological suspension
with a single argument (typically). In contrast, Pyrrhonism deploys particular arguments
for each particular claim. (2) Where Descartes went, as he told us, right for the
foundations, Sextus moves about piecemeal.23 Moreover, one employing the piecemeal
approach is highly likely to be encouraged by past successful applications o f the method
in particular cases: Every individual success would be seen as counting in favor o f the
method.24
Furthermore, (3) when the goal o f Pyrrhonism {ataraxia = tranquility) is borne in
mind, it is very plausible to believe that skepticism could be a great success for me qua
Pyrrhonist, even i f I had only fo u n d piecemeal and incomplete success with the method.
For these reasons, I believe the Pyrrhonists probably met with some success in
approximating their ideal type. It seems likely that many Pyrrhonists succeeded in
suspending belief about all sorts of particular matters while still falling short o f complete
suspension. Moreover, insofar as Pyrrhonism was essentially a eudaimonistic account,
the skeptic might have been able to achieve a fairly satisfactory state o f ataraxia, without
completing his suspension o f all belief. Perhaps a general aloofness and noncommittal
attitude, combined with the suspension of certain particularly problematic beliefs would
be enough to leave the skeptic fairly well o ff—fairly tranquil, that is. In such a case,
there is every reason to believe that such a skeptic would see his skepticism as a great
success, and be more inclined to focus on his thus-far-achieved degree o f ataraxia than on
5
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those matters he had not yet suspended belief over. Indeed, it is plausible to believe that
the success he had met with would offer him encouragement that future successes might
be in the offing.

1.3 Particularly Problematic Beliefs and Ataraxia
In this penultimate section, I would like to amplify one of the reflections from the
foregoing section, which I believe speaks rather directly to the plausibility o f my general
interpretation o f Sextus. I have in mind the claim that certain particularly problematic
beliefs might play a special role in coming to understand the skeptic’s position. In
particular, I think that reflecting on certain particularly problematic beliefs can shed light
on the relation between epoché and ataraxia — i.e., on how or why ataraxia is found to
follow epoché as a shadow follows a body.
This is my proposal. The skeptic claims that, somehow, suspending judgment—
living adoxastös — produces tranquility {ataraxia). This claim can seem rather hard to
understand, especially if we think paradigmatically of beliefs such as “The honey is
sweet” or “The tower is round.” But if we move to consider certain other beliefs, the
claim gains considerable plausibility. Let me take three sorts of illustrative cases: (1)
beliefs about death and the afterlife, (2) beliefs about religion more generally, and (3)
97
beliefs about ethics or, more generally, value theory.
Each o f (1-3) can easily be
imagined to produce disturbance (taraché, the opposite o f ataraxia) or troubledness in a
human life: Maybe I (or my wife, or mother, or best friend) will die and go to a place of
torment, or maybe god (or the gods) will curse my existence, or maybe they already have,
since poverty (laziness, sickness, etc.) is thought to be an evil and I am poor (lazy, sick,
etc.). Were one to regard such possibilities as o f no more concern than whether the
number o f stars is even or odd28— as a matter of no consequence at all, that is— it seems
to me one’s life might well be less troubled.
Now although it is not true that Sextus consistently or explicitly privileges the
importance of epoché concerning such matters as regards the attainment of ataraxia, our
intuitive sense that such a connection is plausible can be supplemented by some brief, but
revealing remarks from PH. In the courses o f the three books that comprise PH, there are
only two passages where Sextus makes any attempt to try to explain why one might
plausibly think ataraxia will follow epoché. Since the second of these two passages {PH
3.235-237) merely repeats the claims of the first {PH 1.27-30), it could reasonably be
said that only one remark in the entire work (or only one twice-remarked remark) bears
on the question. In that remark, Sextus tries to explain how the skeptic’s eschewal of
ethics (or, perhaps, value theory in general) will conduce to ataraxia:
[T]he person who believes that something is by nature good or bad is
constantly upset; when he does not possess the things that seem to be
good, he thinks he is being tormented by things that are by nature bad, and
he chases after the things he supposes to be good; then, when he gets
these, he falls into still more torments because of irrational and
immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely
everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him good. But the
person who takes no position as to what is by nature good or bad neither
avoids nor pursues intensely. As a result, he achieves ataraxia. {PH 1.2728, Mates translation)
•
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I repeat, it is in this passage, and this passage only (if we discount its repetition), that
Sextus addresses the issue in PH ?9 Thus, our intuitive sense that such matters are more
important, supplemented by P H 1.27-30 and 3.235-237, can be taken as at least
plausible— if admittedly far from overwhelming— evidence that these matters are more
“at issue” in the attainment o f ataraxia, and, therefore, more centrally connected to the
success of Pyrrhonism (i.e. the success o f its search for ataraxia).
It is important to note that I am not proposing a scope restriction on epochë. I am
not, that is, saying that the Pyrrhonian skeptic only sought to achieve epochë with respect to
these particularly problematic beliefs. I still maintain that the skeptic seeks epochë about
all non-evident matters falling under his consideration. But he seeks this epochë for a
reason, viz. ataraxia as regards belief. Focusing on certain particularly problematic
beliefs helps clarify why he might have thought ataraxia might follow epochë, and it also
helps us see how his skepticism might well produce some measure o f ataraxia. Thus,
such focus helps us understand how Sextus could have thought his approach was
promising and offered hope o f ever greater, ever more complete success.
If these reflections are correct, then we have a way o f understanding Sextus’
claims about the life o f a skeptic without limiting the scope of epochë or supposing Sextus
to be liar/jester. Sextus was outlining a eudaimonistic account aimed at the attainment o f
ataraxia. Since epochë has been found to result in ataraxia (“as if by chance”), the skeptic
pursues epochë—that is, he pursues the ideal state o f being a “Skeptic.” To be sure, he
does not arrive at that ideal state, though he may well achieve or approximate ataraxia as
regards belief during his pursuit of it.30

1.4 The Psychological Possibility of Pyrrhonism
So, what do I say to my guiding question? Is Pyrrhonism psychologically
possible? Any straightforward, uncompromising response seems out o f place here, but
this much is true: Pyrrhonism seems to me no less psychologically possible than many,
many other ethical theories.31 To be sure, the Pyrrhonian ethically ideal state may not
be—indeed, almost certainly is not— psychologically achievable. Thus, if we interpret
the question o f Pyrrhonism’s psychological possibility as equivalent to the question of the
psychological possibility of complete Pyrrhonian epochë, then we must say Pyrrhonism is
not psychologically possible. But I see no decisive reasons for so interpreting our guiding
question. To note the unachievability o f the Pyrrhonian’s ethically ideal state amounts to
a very general criticism of any ethical view that is inherently aspirational. Any view,
that is, which aims at a state o f self-realization (in the admirable Greek sense) that is not
actually achievable. A philosopher’s reach ought to exceed his grasp— or, at any rate, if
it ought not do so, this is hardly a unique flaw in Pyrrhonism.
I think we ought to admit that the pursuit o f such an ideal state is indeed
psychologically possible, and I think it is plausible to suppose that a Pyrrhonian might
well achieve or approximate his true end, ataraxia, while thus pursuing, and incompletely
exemplifying, epochë. So I see no good reason not to say that Pyrrhonism was, and
arguably remains today,32 psychologically possible, though I concede that this is only so
if we are willing to countenance partial success within an aspirational tradition as
indicative of its success— as surely, I think, we should. If one allows a central role to
aspiration in value theory, one might still strive to live the life adoxastös. Whether that is
a life we ought to consider living is, I think, an important question, though not one I have
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addressed. But that living such a life, that striving for the ideals that give form to such a
life, is possible— humanly possible—I think we must say it is.33

NOTES
1 The Pyrrhonian skeptic only claims to suspend judgment concerning matters that are nonevident. The interpretation of the term “non-evident” is, thus, related to the issue of scope
addressed in the next section: All parties agree that the skeptic suspends judgment about nonevident matters; the dispute is over which matters are, according to the Pyrrhonian, “nonevident.” See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. by Benson Mates as The
Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996), 1.13-15, 16-17. (The Outlines o f Pyrrhonism will hereafter be cited as PH.
This is the common scholarly abbreviation for the work; the designation derives from its
Greek title, Pyrröneioi Hypo typoséis.)
2 In order to further clarify some of my common locutions we might consider (1) whether
Pyrrhonism is believable, (2) whether Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment (epochè) is
psychologically possible, (3) whether Pyrrhonian considerations can move us, or (4) whether
Pyrrhonism (simpliciter) is psychologically possible. I will treat the question (1) whether
Pyrrhonism is believable as (for present purposes) equivalent in meaning to (2) and argue that
(3) bears on both (1) and (2). The core meaning of (1-3) concerns whether Pyrrhonism can be
more than a mere intellectual curiosity, abstractly entertained: Can it have an effect on us? If
so, how great an effect? As for (4)—my title question—I hope to use my reflections on (1-3)
to position us to answer it. (4), I will argue, is not (or need not be taken to be)
straightforwardly equivalent to (1) or (2), though it is closely related to (3). I owe my
awareness of the need for this clarificatory note to Katheryn Doran and Derek Turner.
3 Indictments falling under (ii) are as old as Pyrrhonism I suppose. Such indictments were
revived in the Modern period and can be found sprinkled throughout even the most skeptically
sympathetic Moderns, e.g. (and especially) Hume. For instance, in Hume’s Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed., ed. Richard Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1998), the character Cleanthes tell us that, although he declines to say the skeptics
are “a sect of liars,” he nonetheless “affirm[s] (I hope without offence) that they are a sect of
jesters or milliers” (Part 1, 9). The “jester” theme also appears in Hume’s discussion of
Pyrrhonism in Section 12, Part 2, 160 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f Morals, 3rd
ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975)—I take that as
confirmation that Cleanthes speaks for Hume in the passage cited.
4 As some have correctly noted, “doubt” is not—psychologically—characteristic of the
Pyrrhonian skeptic—he is not a “doubter,” as Mates puts it {The Skeptic Way (cited in note 1,
above), 30). Nonetheless, he may have doubts in my epistemic sense. As I intend for
“epistemic doubts” to be understood here, it is consistent with one’s thinking that the issue
about which one has “epistemic doubts” is incoherent. For example, I could have “epistemic
8
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doubts” in my sense about a set of religious practices I find to be simply incoherent. One
might say instead that one has “epistemic worries” about such issues to avoid the appearance
of comprehension that “doubt” normally implies—one must first conceive the issue(s), then be
dubious. But “worries” sounds too weak to my ear, and “epistemic grounds for suspension of
belief’ sounds too wordy. On this issue, see Mates, The Skeptic Way, 30-32.
5 Enquiry, 160.
61 will assume the reader’s familiarity with the basic shape of the position.
7 The Greek word epochë means ‘suspension of judgment.’ I will treat ‘judgment’ and ‘belief as
equivalent, and I will treat each as entailing a relatively stable attitude of ‘taking-true’ some
proposition about how things are.
8 See Michael Frede’s “The Skeptic’s Beliefs” and “The Skeptic’s Two Kinds of Assent and the
Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,” both contained in his isssays in Ancient Philosophy
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 179-200 and 201-222, respectively. In
his recent book Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 5 ff. Robert Fogelin casts his lot with Frede.
9 Granting that Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible on a Frede interpretation of the scope of
Pyrrhonian epochë, I want to consider whether it is also psychologically possible on the
Burnyeat interpretation. I can make the necessary arguments without deciding which
interpretation is the most historically accurate one. (Though, as my text confesses, I side with
Burnyeat.)
10 See Burnyeat’s “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?” in Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M
Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 20-53 and “The
Sceptic in His Place and Time” in Philosophy and Histoiy, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B.
Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 225-254.
The Burnyeat interpretation has also been defended by Jonathan Barnes, “The Beliefs of a
Pyrrhonist,” Proceedings o f the Cambridge Philological Society 28 (1982), 1-29. Barnes
allows that there is some evidence for the Frede interpretation, but insists that the “general
tenor of PH is . . . indubitably rustic” [“rustic” here refers to the Burnyeat-style interpretation]
(ibid., 18). (All the papers referred to in this note and note 8 have been conveniently collected
in a volume edited by Burnyeat and Frede: The OriginalSceptics: A Controversy
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).)
11 On this interpretation, the notion of “non-evident” is cashed out in terms of “being about how
things are, as opposed to how they merely (non-epistemically) seem or appear to be.” See PH
1.13-15, 16-17, 19-20, 21-22, Adversus Mathematicos (M), trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press), Vol. 3: 11.18-19 and Burnyeat’s “Can the Sceptic Live His
Scepticism?”, 25-26, 46-47. Thus, something is a “non-evident matter” if and only if it
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concerns “how things are.” (N.B.: I no longer believe this view is completely correct.
Neither does Burnyeat. However, since both he and I continue to think that the completely
correct view leaves the distinction between what the skeptic will accept (how things nonepistemically seem) and what the skeptic will reject (beliefs about how things are) untouched,
I will pass over the troublesome task of making the appropriate adjustments vis-à-vis the
notion of the “non-evident.” For Burnyeat’s adjustments, see “The Sceptic in His Place and
Time,” p.229-231, 243-244.)
121 see no reason why the Pyrrhonist would, should, or must bite the bullet and claim to “go out
at the window.” Even though we have stories of roughly that pattern about Pyrrho himself
(whose friends, we are told, had to follow him about to prevent him from walking off cliffs!),
we should share Hegel’s judgment that such stories were in all likelihood concocted by the
skeptics’ opponents to parody their position. (For the stories, see “The Life of Pyrrho” in
Lives of Eminent Philosophers [hereafter, DL] by Diogenes Laertius, trans. R. D. Hicks
(London: William Heinemann, 1925), vol. 2, book 9.62; for Hegel’s assessment, see his
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Sim son (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), Vol. 2: 336.)
The only developed version of Pyrrhonism that we have (Sextus) answers this sort of worry with
the four-fold regimen {PH 1.23-24; cf. M 11.162-167 and DL 9.108), and Diogenes himself
reports that Aenesidemus—an important Pyrrhonian skeptic, responsible, we believe, for the
Ten Modes—denied these stories were true of Pyrrho (DL 9.62). Moreover, if, as many
suppose, Pyrrho traveled to India with Alexander (DL 9.61, 63 and Everard Flintoff s “Pyrrho
and India,” Phronesis 25 (1980), 88-108) and lived to be nearly 90 years old (DL 9.62), such
stories seem far-fetched indeed—to have friends such as Pyrrho would have needed to stay
alive would be a wonder indeed! We should therefore not take Pyrrhonism to be committed to
biting the bullet in response to Cleanthes/Hume. (Interestingly, Hume’s own account of
Custom or Habit seems strikingly similar to the four-fold regimen of Sextus. So Hume had
the right answer to the worry, but refused to allow the Pyrrhonists to use it!)
Regarding the Humean or non-Humean basis of Cleanthes’ Criterion, some readers have
wondered whether Cleanthes speaks for Hume in the passage cited in the text. For my own
part, I believe each of the three characters speaks for Hume at various points in the Dialogues,
and I am convinced Cleanthes speaks for Hume in this instance. My position is further
strengthened by the comments made, in Hume’s own voice, in the Enquiry, Section 12, Part 2,
see esp. 158-159, 160. (In this connection, see again note 3 above.)
13 As the text indicates, I believe that epochê is meant to be induced by consideration of arguments.
It might be argued, however, that all that is really necessary is that we are brought to epochê by
whatever route works, and such a route need not involve arguments or at any rate not good
arguments (cf. PH 3.280-281). By my lights, however, Sextus certainly appears to give
arguments, and judging from the difficulty philosophical posterity has had in answering him
many of these appear to be good arguments. Moreover, even if we judge that the arguments
Sextus offers are not good, I would still claim that the prospective Pyrrhonian must judge
them to be good if he is to use them to reach epochê in the manner Sextus suggests. For a
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decidedly less cognitivist reading of Pyrrhonism, see Michael Williams’ provocative paper
“Scepticism Without Theory,” Review o f Metaphysics 41 (1988), 547-588.
14 Suspension of belief is not itself the ethical ideal, of course; ataraxia is {PH 1.12, 25-30, 215).
But since ataraxia turns out to follow suspension {epochê) “as a shadow follows a body” {PH
1.29), the ethically ideal type or person for the Pyrrhonians suspends belief. They aim to be
like the ethically ideal type. In the same way, the Stoics don’t directly aim at tranquility;
instead they aim at wanting things to be just as they are, and so on, since this, they believe,
produces tranquility. And, more generally, as the Paradox of Hedonism shows, one is
misguided in seeking some goals (e.g. happiness) directly: You don’t try to be happy; you do
things that (you think) are likely to lead to happiness.
15 One might wonder whether there is some threshold concerning degree of conformity to the
ideal state beyond which one counts as, e.g., a Christian, but below which one does not. For
my own part, I am not at all convinced (though I won’t deny) that the issue concerning such
ethical cases has anything much to do with your own achievements vis-à-vis the ideal state. I
suspect that the only real objection to your claim to be, e.g., a Christian would be that in so
claiming you are being disingenuous. Otherwise, you are Christian, though perhaps not an
exemplary one. (Of course, your lack of “achievement” could be proffered as evidence o f the
charge o f insincerity, but if so insincerity, not lack of “achievement” would be the real
objection.) However, as will appear below, I think the skeptic can show enough
“achievement” in his progress to merit the appellation “skeptic.” And, as will also appear
below, if the success the “skeptic” has achieves its desired effect, then whether other people
call him a “skeptic” will be of no concern to him at all.
16 On the translation of phone, see Mates, The Skeptic Way, 65, 255.
17 N.B.: This exhortation should be read as an elliptical version of (what Kant would call) a
hypothetical imperative, not a categorical imperative. Its full expression would be something
like, “Since we want ataraxia and it seems to us that ataraxia follows epoché like a shadow
follows a body, let us have no beliefs!” The point isn’t to dogmatize about the desirability of
ataraxia; the point is to speak to those who are already seeking ataraxia {PH 1.12).
18 On the very important matter of the skeptical slogans, see PH 1.187-208, esp/191, 204-205.
191 owe this wonderfully precise mode of expression to Jeffrey Tlumak.
20 Concerning the fact that the Problem of the External World was not formulated in antiquity and
also the question whether Descartes created the modern skeptical problem, see Myles
Burnyeat’s splendid paper “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and
Berkeley Missed” in Idealism: Past and Present, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), esp. 32-33, 41, and 43 ff. I would not claim (nor does Burnyeat) that
Descartes created the Problem of the External World ex nihilo. We know he was familiar with
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the then-available skeptical texts. But his transformation of these skeptical materials was far
more innovative than even he himself believed. Consider, e.g., his reply to the third set of
objections (from Thomas Hobbes) where he disowns any claim to originality concerning the
skeptical doubts in his First Meditation {The Philosophical Writings o f Descartes, trans. John
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), Vol. 2: 121). Descartes sold himself short on this point.
21 Although such cases are not helpful in trying to understand Sextus’ claims about Pyrrhonism—
since we will misunderstand him if we allow such anachronistic tinkering—such Cartesian
cases are relevant to Pyrrhonism’s current status, since we now have the Cartesian problem to
consider. (See also note 31, below.)
22 See note 4, above.
23 Sextus is not in principle opposed to using “foundational” attacks (e.g. PH 2.84), but he does so
very infrequently and he is far more inclined to be maximally detailed and thorough (as any
reader of M will attest!).
24 For the Pyrrhonian, the past successes are the cause of his expectation of future successes, not a
justification of this expectation. Remember our aim is to understand Sextus, and I think we
can fairly credit him with this sort of expectation without being forced to also attribute to him
the belief that his expectation is justified.
25 Sextus rehearses Epicurus’ famous argument that death is of no concern to us {PH 3.229), as
well as other such arguments {PH 3.226 ff.).
26 Sextus gives a clever, muscular version of the Problem of Evil {PH 3.9-12). He also presents
other problems for religious beliefs {PH 3.2-8, M 9.29-48, 137-190), though he allows that
the Pyrrhonian will avow some religious claims without believing them {PH 3.2, M 9.49).
One might imagine this last point by considering what young children do when they first
begin to imitate their parents during religious ceremonies; or one might think of what many
adults do when they attend such services out of deference to a spouse or parent or to tradition,
etc.
27 The sections of PH dealing with ethics (3.168-279) have a very general flavor, covering things
“good, bad, and indifferent” (3.168). I would be inclined to say the real target is value theory
in general. (Sextus also treats ethical matters in PH 1.145-163 [The Tenth Mode] and \\\M 11
[“Against the Ethicists”].)
28 This example can be found at PH 2.90 ff., as well as elsewhere in both PH and M, and
Burnyeat has a nice discussion of it in “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?” 40. It is the
best heuristic I am aware of for letting yourselffeel the real phenomenology of epochs.
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29 A more elaborate statement of the view expressed at PH 1.25-30, 3.235-237 can be found at M
11.110-140 and 141-167.
30 Three notes: (1) The skeptic will not achieve perfect ataraxia, since some disturbance (e.g.,
hunger, thirst) is unavoidable. He will only achieve or only hopes to achieve complete ataraxia
as regards belief {PH 1.25-26, 3.235, M 11.141-162). (2) Jonathan Barnes has argued that the
issue of epochè beyond the degree of epochè required for the attainment of ataraxia is otiose and
should have been seen as otiose by Sextus (“The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” 18-19). My own
suspicion is that Sextus believed that a full and complete state of ataraxia as regards belief
required total epochè. Thus, in the language of my interpretative model, less-than-complete
epochè is skepticism, and as such is less ideal than “Skepticism.” Nonetheless, Barnes’
emphasis on the importance of the epochè / ataraxia relation as a tool for interpreting Sextus is
something I greatly admire in his paper. (3) Although I am not sure how much probative force
we should judge Diogenes’ account of Pyrrho to have— some parts of it seem very dubious,
see note 12 above—Pyrrho is reported as having been very tranquil and yet as having once
been “enraged in his sister’s cause” and at another time “terrified” “when a cur rushed at him”
(DL 9.66). Whether these would amount to non-skeptical slips or not is impossible to tell
given the brevity of the reports, but Pyrrho is reported to have replied that it is “not easy
entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one’s might against
facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word” (ibid.). If these really were non-skeptical slips
and if the report of Pyrrho’s reply can be accepted, this might offer some additional support
for my aspirational account of Pyrrhonism: If Pyrrho himself, the eponymous forefather and
patron saint of Pyrrhonism (of whom Sextus remarks that he appears to have “applied himself
to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors” PH 1.7; see also DL
9.69-70), failed to achieve complete epochè, then perhaps the aspirational account can find
further confirmation in the life of Pyrrho—“one should strive with all one’s might . . . ” (DL
9.66, my emphasis) Again, though, I am not sure we can place much stock in Diogenes’
account, so I leave these remarks for the reader to judge.
31 In addition to the ethical theories embedded in Stoicism and Christianity, as already mentioned,
one might plausibly add some of paradigmatically existentialist ethical positions, esp. those of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. For instance, if we went looking, how many Knights of Faith or
Übermenschen should we expect to find? (If we say “none, if we are speaking strictly” does
that constitute some sort of decisive objection to these authors?)
32 Since my primary aim has been to develop an adequate understanding of Sextus by sketching
an aspirational account of Pyrrrhonism, I have concentrated mainly on the ancient situation, as
it were. I think that my aspirational account of Pyrrhonism can be extended to cover the
modern situation (one which includes Cartesian skepticism), though I cannot adequately
defend such a claim here. (Every paper needs a promissory note.)
33 I would like to thank Katheryn Doran, Jose Medina, Tim Roche, Jeffrey Tlumak, and Derek
Turner for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wish to express my indebtedness to
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the participants of a small reading group (“The Friends of Pyrrho”) which I convened to study
Sextus’ Adversus Mathematicos with ine: Scott Aikin, Allen Coates, Jeffrey Tlumak, and
Derek Turner.

